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Abstract: 
 
In this paper we calibrate the social cost of optimal taxes in a class of imperfectly competitive 
economies and examine the correspondence of this social cost with the number of tax instruments and 
the number and the sources of distortions. We calibrate the Ramsey equilibrium for three standard 
models of imperfect competition. These settings are different in number of sources of market distortion 
and number of tax instruments. Our calibration clearly shows that optimal taxes in an imperfectly 
competitive economy incur lower social cost than those in a competitive economy, implying that they 
are generally more efficient as competition enhancing policy tools. We find that optimal taxes in our 
models can cost up to 48% less forgone consumption relative to those in a competitive market 
economy.  
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Introduction. 
 
In this paper we examine the social cost of optimal taxes in an imperfectly competitive economy. 
A combined measure of the welfare cost and the administrative cost of taxes is represented by a 
single multiplier of the standard Ramsey (1927) planner’s optimization problem. This multiplier, 
associated with the implementability constraint of the Ramsey planner’s problem, is a present 
value measure of the loss in utility due to distorting taxes. We define this loss as the social cost of 
optimal taxes, and we present a simple method of calibrating this multiplier. We conduct the 
analysis on imperfectly competitive economies because we aim to examine the correspondence 
between taxes and monopoly distortions and the impact of this correspondence on the social cost 
of taxes. We examine the correspondence between the size of market distortion, the sources of 
distortions, the number of tax instruments and the social cost of optimal taxes.  
 
Previous studies, such as Ortiguieira (1998) and Coleman II (2000) calibrate the welfare gains 
from switching to the Ramsey policy in a competitive economy. Guo and Lansing (1999) calibrate 
the steady state Ramsey taxes in an imperfectly competitive economy and explain the sensitivity 
of Ramsey taxes for changes in key parameters of the model. Jonsson (2004) considers an 
environment of imperfect competition and calibrates the welfare cost of taxes in a decentralized 
competitive equilibrium. The main concentration of Jonsson (2004) was to examine the loss in 
consumption (and utility) that is induced by a combination of monopoly distortions and a set of 
arbitrarily chosen tax rates. In this paper we extend these important works.  
 
We extend a standard model of Ramsey taxation with an imperfectly competitive goods market, 
with multiple sources of monopoly distortions, and with a single as well as many tax instruments. 
This enables us to present a class of models that can be explored in order to examine the 
correspondence between the sources of market distortions, the number of tax instruments and the 
social cost of optimal taxes. We present a method of calibrating the social cost of Ramsey taxes 
and the same if the economy were perfectly competitive. We also calibrate the sensitivity of the 
social cost of optimal taxes for changes in the key parameters of the models. This analysis is 
therefore useful if one is interested in comparing the social desirability of the optimal (and not 
arbitrarily chosen) taxes in both perfectly and imperfectly competitive economies. 
 
We follow the primal approach to the optimal taxation problem (due primarily to Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, 1980). This approach characterizes the optimal wedges in allocations that can be 
implemented in a decentralized equilibrium. The taxation authority needs to choose the taxes that 
can implement the wedges. This optimal choice of taxes is derived from the welfare maximization 
problem of the taxation authority. Typically, an implementable set of distorting taxes induces a 
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deviation from equilibrium welfare which is captured in the Ramsey planner’s programming 
problem. We derive a shadow measure of the social cost of taxation from the deviation of Ramsey 
equilibrium level of welfare from the first best level of welfare
2
.  
 
We calibrate the social cost of the optimal taxes for three settings. First, we consider a labour-only 
economy with imperfect competition in product market and a single income tax (e.g. average 
effective tax on households). The first setting is thus representative of an economy with single 
source of market distortion and single tax instrument. Then to the first setting we introduce labour 
market imperfection in the form of simple monopolistic wage setting. This setting introduces 
multiple sources of market distortion but continues with a single tax instrument. Finally, we 
consider an imperfectly competitive economy with labour and capital and a tax code that assigns 
distinct taxes to income from factors. This setting allows for multiple tax instruments with a single 
source of distortion. We consider distortion in the private markets in its simplest and most familiar 
form, one that stems from having a fixed number of firms in a sector producing imperfectly 
substitutable intermediate goods
3
.  
 
We use a sample calibration in order to verify both the methodology that we propose and the 
underlying intuitions of our analysis. We find that in an imperfectly competitive economy the 
optimal taxes are associated with lower social cost relative to that in a competitive economy. 
Relative to the competitive markets setting in an imperfectly competitive economy with only one 
source of market distortion, a single optimal tax instrument is associated with 42% lesser welfare 
cost. If there are more taxes, the economy is associated with 1% lesser social cost relative to its 
competitive market equivalent. The intuition stems from the simplicity of tax administration. 
Since a significant part of the social cost is the cost of administering distorting taxes, having more 
taxes to administer is more costly than having a single tax to administer. We also find that the 
correspondence between the social cost of taxes and the sources of market distortion depends 
crucially on the size of market distortion. In general, we find that higher levels of market 
distortions are associated with lower levels of social cost of taxes. The rate at which the social cost 
declines can vary between settings with a single source of market distortion and multiple sources 
of market distortion. With multiple sources of market distortion, we find that the social cost of 
taxes is 48% less than that in a competitive economy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 With only distorting taxes in the scheme, the planner’s welfare maximizing problem involves, in addition to the 
resource constraint, a constraint that restricts welfare maximizing taxes to be implementable. This added restriction 
in the planner’s problem is associated with a present value cost of a sequence of tax plans, i.e. the discounted 
social cost of administering the tax policy. Because this measure is related to the excess burden of taxes, we define 
this measure as the social cost of optimal taxes. 
3
 This is in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Judd (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1999). 
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The Social Cost of Optimal Taxes. 
 
In order to motivate our main analysis we first present the underlying theory and a sample 
calibration in a competitive market setting. We consider a very standard one sector neoclassical 
model of Ramsey taxation (e.g. Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2000, ch.12). The final good )( ty  is 
produced using labour )( tn  and capital )( tk  as inputs and is traded in competitive market. The 
resource constraint is
4
: 
 
011   tttttt kkgcnkf )(),(       (1) 
 
where  private consumption, government consumption and investment are denoted by 
tc , tg  and 
ti , respectively, and (.)f  satisfies standard regularity conditions. The government’s period t  
budget constraint is 01
1
 

ttttttntttkt gbbRnwkr  , where 0 ggt  for each t , 
tb  denotes the government’s indebtness to the private sector, and t  denotes tax rates for 
},{ nk . The representative household solves the following problem: 
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The utility function satisfies standard regularity conditions. The competitive equilibrium 
conditions include equilibrium factor prices, optimality conditions from the household’s problem, 
the resource constraint and the transversality condition. Given a preset revenue target, the 
government chooses the tax rates in order to maximize welfare such that these taxes are feasible 
and implementable, i.e. the allocation and prices generated by these welfare maximizing taxes 
satisfy (1) and the competitive equilibrium. One can thus characterize the Ramsey planner’s 
problem as one of choosing an allocation in order to maximize welfare subject to the resource 
constraint (1) and the following implementability constraint: 
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000
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p
tntc
t ncntuctu       (2) 
                                                 
4
 Throughout the paper, we use subscript t  to denote the level of a variable at period t , and t  in parentheses to 
denote the value of a derivative at period t . 
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where })]1()0()1){[(0(),,( 000000 bkfunc kkck
p   . In order to solve this 
problem, one can conveniently define a Pseudo-type utility function, or more intuitively, a second 
best welfare function: 
 
])()([),(),,( tntc
p
tt
p
tt ntuctuncuncG        
 
where 0p  is the Lagrange multiplier on (3.1). Intuitively, p  provides a shadow measure of 
the utility cost of raising government revenues through distorting taxation. Given the Ramsey 
programming problem if (.)
*G  denotes the maximum value of (.)G  evaluated in a steady 
state, ][(.)(.) ****** nucuuG nc
p   , i.e. the second best level of welfare is equal to the first 
best level of welfare, (.)*u , less the loss in welfare due to distorting taxes, equal to 
][ **** nucu nc
p  . The loss in welfare is measured in terms of the loss in allocation due to the 
competitive equilibrium reaction of taxpayers, which is multiplied by the shadow price of taxes, 
p . This multiplier’s value is therefore representative of the amount (in terms of consumption) 
taxpayers are willing pay in order to replace a unit of the distorting tax with a unit of a lump sum 
tax
5
.  
 
If the government’s plan includes heavy taxation at the beginning (in order to reduce distorting tax 
rates in the future), 
p  is relatively higher. If *  denotes the maximum value Lagrangian 
associated with the government’s welfare maximization problem, 0)0()0( 0
*
0  kfu kc
p
k   
for all 
0k , as long as 0
p . This explains the celebrated result of zero capital income tax in a 
steady state, due primarily to Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). A zero tax on capital income is 
implementable in the long run only if it is possible to tax capital early, which incurs a high social 
cost. The idea is to confiscate capital income initially and frontload revenue so that 
p  is high, 
and thereafter reduce capital income tax to zero and use bond financing for future revenue. 
 
Consider a sample characterization of a steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. Let 
]1[ln),( tttt ncncu   and 




1
),( tttt nknkf , where 0,  , )1,0( . The time-
invariant version of the Ramsey equilibrium includes the following equations in (3): 
 
0]1[1 11     nk         (a)  
                                                 
5
 For instance if the value of this multiplier is high, the social cost of distorting taxes is high but that of lump sum 
taxes are low, implying that administering the second best tax policy costs relatively higher amounts of forgone 
consumption.  
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Proposition 1.  There is a unique solution to the system (3) implying that there is a unique 
set of steady state allocation, taxes and prices associated with the Ramsey equilibrium. 
 
Proof:  Solve (3a) for 
1n , and substitute in (3d) in order to derive 
)1(
)(





gc
k . Then, substitute back in the expression for 
1n and solve for n . 
Substitute for both k and n  in (3b) in order to derive 
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c . Notice 
that c  is unique if the multiplier p  is unique. One can compute a unique value for p  using 
(3b) and (3c) in terms of the initial conditions. For unique c  and given g , both ,k  n  and their 
corresponding prices are unique. The competitive equilibrium condition 
cnkn 
  )1)(1(  gives a unique labour income tax rate. With 0k , the time-
invariant version of the no-arbitrage condition gives R . In order to find the steady state level of 
government bond, b , evaluate the household’s time t  budget constraint at time 1t , and 
substitute in the household’s first order conditions. This gives the following recursive equation: 
 
0)1())(1()( 1112
1
121  

 ttnttttctc cntubbRktuktu     (4) 
 
The time-invariant version of this equation gives ])1([)]1([ 211 ccnkRb    , 
which is unique.           
 
The calibrations we perform in this paper refers to the problem of finding parameter values, given 
some constant growth observations for an actual economy, such that the constant growth 
behaviour of that model economy matches the growth observations for that actual economy. In 
line with Cooley and Prescott (1995) we define an algorithm as a sequence of steps to numerically 
compute parameters, given a set of steady state observations of an actual economy. A feature of an 
algorithm is that at any step parameters whose values have been determined in earlier steps can be 
used, but parameters whose values have not been determined in earlier steps cannot be used. We 
 7 
use a representative dataset for calibrating the parameters for our models. We then use these 
parameters and corresponding steady state observations in order to compute the Ramsey taxes and 
their associated social cost. Given the algorithm to calibrate the parameters, for a given set of 
steady state observations there exists a unique set of calibrated Ramsey taxes and their associated 
social cost. Any change in the steady state observations thus requires recalibration of the 
parameters which in turns recalibrates the Ramsey taxes and their associated social cost. 
 
For the purpose of illustration, we consider a simple calibration of the steady state of this 
competitive market model using post war US economy data approximately for the period 1960-
2008. The set of parameters of the model are ),,,,(  . The steady state observations of 
government consumption-output and bond-output ratios are the ones taken from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data-FRED II. In seasonally adjusted real terms this data 
gives average government consumption to output ratio equal to 0.23, and government bond to 
output ratio equal to 0.51. Annual data for the US economy’s capital stock and investment for the 
period 1960-1996 are collected from the US Department of Commerce’s Revised Fixed 
Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States. This gives steady state capital to output ratio 
equal to 3.31, and investment to output ratio equal to 0.22. These, including profit to output ratio 
which we use later, are in appendix, table 1. 
 
Given a time endowment normalized to one, Cooley & Prescott (1995) pins down the fraction of 
worked time to a range of 0.2 to 0.3. For the current study we hold 30.n  as a benchmark. We 
consider the annual real interest rate of 4%. Using (3a) this gives 96150. . The steady state 
version of capital’s law of motion, which with steady state observations of capital-output and 
investment-output ratio give 06640. . Next, (3a) gives 10640.r . Then 313./ yk  and 
10640.r  pin down 3523.0 . The steady state version of the resource constraint gives the 
consumption-output ratio equal to 0.55. We consider the steady state version of the government 
budget constraint with zero capital tax (the steady state tax rate in the Ramsey equilibrium), and 
divide both sides by y . We evaluate the resulting expression for the observed steady state 
government expenditure to output ratio and bond to output ratio in order to derive 
83220./)( yw n . This, together with the steady state equilibrium factor price equations give 
1592.)/( yw , and therefore 38230.n . Estimate for the Lagrange multiplier, i.e. the 
social cost of these taxes is 4921.0p . Once this is calibrated, we verify if this social cost is 
associated with the optimal tax (i.e. 38230.n ) that generate allocation and prices which are 
consistent with the steady state of the competitive equilibrium. 
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An Imperfectly Competitive Economy with a Single Tax 
Instrument. 
 
Our main analysis starts with a very simple discrete time model of imperfect competition with a 
single income tax. We refer to this model as model 1. The final goods sector is perfectly 
competitive (competitive sector, hereafter), and the intermediate goods sector is imperfectly 
competitive (monopoly sector, hereafter). The competitive sector produces 
ty  (the numeraire) 
using a continuum ]1,0[j  of intermediate goods. The final good is used for private 
consumption )( tc  and government consumption )( tg . The two technologies are: 
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
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where jz  denotes the level of intermediate good j , ),( 10  indexes the degree of monopoly 
power exercised by suppliers of the intermediate good
6
, jn  is working time and ],( 10 . The 
representative firm in the competitive sector faces the following sequence of problems: 
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where jp  denotes the relative price of intermediate good j . The solution gives the inverse 
demand function 
 
 jttjt zyp . Firm j  in the monopoly sector take the wage rate and prices 
of other firms as given when choosing price according to 
 
 jttjt zyp  and labour to maximize 
profits. Firm j ’s decision problem is: 
 
][max
)(
jtjtjtt
n
nwny
jt

 1
       
                                                 
6 1  represents very low elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods giving higher market power to 
firms in the intermediate goods sector. 0  implies intermediate goods are near perfect substitutes. 
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Firms producing final goods earn zero profits in equilibrium, i.e. 0
1
0






  jtjtt zpy
, which together 
with 
 
 jttjt zyp  and symmetry implies that 1 tjt pp  for all j . Moreover, the 
symmetric equilibrium price implies equilibrium wage rate: 
 
1)()1(  ttt nzw          (5.3) 
 
The equilibrium profits for the monopoly sector is given by )]1(1[   tt z . The 
government consumes exogenous 0 ggt  each period and raises the required revenue from 
taxation of income and profit. We consider a tax code where the government taxes wage income at 
rate 
t  and profits at a rate t , where ],[ 10
7
. The government also trades one period bond 
to households which pay interest at the rate 
tr . The government’s period t  budget constraint is 
given by: 
 
1
1
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1
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
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where jtw denotes real wage, and tb  denotes bond. Households are endowed with one unit of 
time at each period and ownership of firms. Households have identical preferences over 
consumption and leisure, and they like both. Preferences for the representative household are 
given by: 
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0t
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where )1,0(  is the subjective discount rate, tl  is leisure and (.)u  satisfies standard regularity 
conditions. The representative household’s utility maximization problem is: 
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7 Different values of the parameter   will illustrate the government’s fiscal treatment of distributed profits. For 
instance, 0  implies profits escape all direct taxation, and 1  implies profits and wage income are taxed 
at the same rate. 
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where 
0b  given, and standard non-negativity restrictions apply. In a symmetric equilibrium all 
firms in the monopoly sector produce the same level of intermediate goods and hire the same 
amount of labour. The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the following system (8) for the 
set of endogenous variables },,,,,,,,{ ttttttttt yzpwbnc  : 
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ttt gcn 
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11  tttttttt bnwrbg )()(        (i) 
 
The equilibrium profit to output ratio for this model is linked to the degree of returns to scale in 
monopoly sector, the price mark up ratio  , and the parameter  , such that8: 
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We use the primal approach in order to derive the conditions that characterize the Ramsey 
allocation. Then we look for the tax rate that can implement the second-best wedges. The Ramsey 
allocation can be characterized by designing a problem where the government chooses the 
allocation 

0},{ ttt nc  in order to maximize (7) subject to the resource constraint (8b) and the 
implementability constraint: 
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8
According to Basu & Fernald’s (1997) estimates on typical US industry profit ratio, the value of the price mark up 
ratio assuming constant returns to scale technology in manufacturing industry is 1.03. Bayoumi. Laxton & Pesenti 
(2004) present a relatively more recent estimate of mark up ratio equal to 1.23 for the overall US economy and 
1.35 for the Euro area. The estimate for the US for instance, assuming that 1  in the current setting amounts to 
an estimate of   equal to 0.186 (for the Euro area it is 0.259). In this model for instance, if the profit ratio is 5% 
and degree of returns to scale in the intermediate goods sector is 1, 051. . With 1 , the profit ratio is 
simply equal to  .  
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where )( 00 1 rR  , and 0r , 0b  and tg  are given. We can express the term tt  )1(   in (10) 
in terms of allocations using (8d), such that  
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Let 0  denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (10), and define 
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where  
tt  )( 1  is defined according to (11). Let 

0tt }{  denote the sequence of Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the resource constraint (8b). The Ramsey problem’s Lagrangian is: 
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The consolidated first order conditions for the Ramsey optimum due to changes in allocations are: 
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We consider a utility function that is separable in consumption and labour, and linear in labour. 
This assumption is supported by Hansen (1985), among others. We evaluate (12.1a) and (8d) in a 
steady state and derive the optimal tax rate, given by: 
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If one considers competitive markets in this setting, it is necessary to rerun the Ramsey problem in 
order to derive the competitive market equivalent of   and the optimal tax rate. We denote the 
corresponding steady state tax rate by 
p
t  and the multiplier by 
p , and in a steady state of the 
competitive market equivalent of this model, 
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For the remaining two models, we follow the same method of rerunning the Ramsey problem for 
two sector competitive market settings in order to derive the competitive market analogue of the 
social cost of optimal taxes and the optimal taxes. This is because for each setting, the dynamic 
path of tax rates that achieves a Ramsey steady state is different. Given a set of initial conditions 
and tax rates numerous paths of tax rates can achieve the Ramsey steady state. The quest is 
therefore choosing the paths that maximize welfare and are implementable. Implementability is 
ensured by imposing an additional constraint in the planner’s optimization problem. Starting from 
the same initial tax rates (held given), each individual path of tax rates (and bonds) that reaches 
the Ramsey steady state is associated with a different social cost, i.e. each individual path of tax 
rates that are implementable in the decentralized equilibrium can induce different levels of forgone 
utility. Depending on which path of tax rate is chosen, the social cost of these taxes will vary. This 
intuition holds same for a competitive market economy. 
 
 
Monopolistic Wage Setting. 
 
We now consider an extension of model 1 with the simplest form of monopolistic wage setting 
behaviour of workers. Along with the single tax distortion, we introduce two forms of market 
distortion in our model. We assume that the labour market is imperfectly competitive and subject 
to monopolistic wage setting, i.e. wages are set with a mark up compared to a fully competitive 
outcome, leading to a socially suboptimal level of working hours. We will call it model 2. 
 
Assume that households collectively organize in a trade union which acts as a monopolistic wage 
setter. Wages are set for one period, and the wage-setting behaviour takes into account the static 
constraint imposed by the labour demand schedule )( jtjt wnn  . Since firms are small relative to 
the economy, they are unable to behave in a strategic manner towards the wage setting behaviour. 
This simplification removes the hold-up problem (which typically arises under firm specific 
bargaining). We assume that the behaviour of the union is myopic in the sense that the 
intertemporal feedback effects of wage setting are not taken into account. The union is also 
assumed not to influence profits which are distributed back to its members. The institutional set up 
which generates the market inefficiency is taken as given by the government when designing the 
tax policy, implying that corrective taxes or subsidies are the only channel to address the labour 
and intermediate goods market distortion. The proportional tax rate on wage in this model is 
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denoted by 
m
t . Imposing symmetry, the wage function which is the wage setting constraint for 
the trade union’s maximization problem is: 
 
1
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The wage elasticity of labour demand therefore is 
)]1(1[
1




w . Acting on behalf of its 
members, the trade union maximizes utility subject to the budget constraints and the labour 
demand constraint. The mark up of net wages over the marginal rate of substitution between 
labour and consumption is equal to 
)1(
1
 
, which in turns is equal to 
]1[ w
w


.  
 
The implementability constraint for the corresponding Ramsey problem is: 
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The Pseudo utility function associated with the Ramsey problem is:  
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The first order condition corresponding to the Ramsey problem for variation in labour supply for 
1t  is 1
1
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In a steady state, the optimal tax rate is given by: 
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A Model with Many Tax Instruments. 
 
The final extension of model 1 we consider is one with capital and a set of income taxes. We call 
it model 3. We go back to our basic assumption that factor markets are competitive. Since we 
introduce capital and a set of income taxes, we simplify the model by removing government 
bonds
9
. In this model intermediate goods production requires labour and capital, and final goods 
production requires intermediate goods and labour. We define leisure in this model as 
ztytt nnl 1 . The two technologies are: 
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where zysnst ,,   is working time in sector s , tk  is capital. In addition to time endowment and 
property rights, households are endowed with a strictly positive amount of capital at 0t . The 
final good can be consumed or invested. The government’s tax instruments are ns  and k  for 
labour and capital, and k , with ]1,0[  for profits. The resource constraint (with symmetry) 
is: 
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We denote the wages and the return to capital by sw  and r , respectively. The representative firm 
in the competitive sector faces the following sequence of problems: 
 
                                                 
9 It is simple to understand that adding bonds to the model does not alter any of the analyses to follow. To start 
with, we could have reconstruct models 1 and 2 as static models without government bonds. But in models 1 and 
2, since there is a single income tax the government bond performs the role of an orthogonal policy instrument. 
Any change in the single tax instrument in models 1 and 2 can be supplemented by a change in government bonds 
that would keep government’s revenue requirement fixed.  
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The profit maximization problem of the j -th firm in the monopoly sector is: 
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The representative household’s problem is: 
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Symmetric equilibrium conditions include standard transversality condition and the following 
system (21.1) 
 
10  ztyt nn         (a) 
 

1
yttt nzy          (b) 
 

1
zttt nkz          (c) 
tytzttttt knnkkgc )(
)(




 1
11
1      (d) 






))((
)()(



1111
ytttt nzyp       (e) 
tytyt ynw
11  ))((          (f) 
tztzt ynw
111  ))(()(         (g) 
ttt ykr
11  )()(         (h) 




11
ytzttt nnk
)(
)(        (i) 
)( tttktztztztytytytt krnwnwg        (j) 
ststcns wtutu ))(()(  1  for zys ,      (k)  
1
11 )]1()[(]1)1[(

  tutur cctkt       (l) 
 
 16 
The implementability constraint associated with this equilibrium is: 
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utility function is: 
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where 0~   is the multiplier associated with (22). Let 0}
~{ tt  denote the sequence of Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the resource constraint (22.1d). The Ramsey equilibrium allocations 
corresponding to model 3 include (21.1d), (22) and the following system (23): 
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We consider the Ramsey policy in a steady state. The steady state version of the Ramsey 
equilibrium and the symmetric equilibrium together imply: 
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Equation (24.1) captures the differential taxation result of Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971). It says 
that since the intermediate goods sector is imperfectly competitive, it is optimal to set a relatively 
lower labour income tax in the intermediate goods sector in order to compensate for the loss in 
income
10
. Equation (24.2) reinterprets the capital tax ambiguity result of Guo and Lansing (1999). 
It says that the sign of optimal capital tax rate is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of 
the two opposing effects. Given the current setting, these effects are the distortion effect and the 
welfare effect of profit-seeking investment (see Selim, 2010 for further details). The optimal 
policy may subsidize (tax) capital income if the distortion effect (investment effect) dominates. 
 
 
Calibration of Models 1 and 2. 
 
We consider the following specification for utility: 
 
tttt lclcu  )ln(),(         (25) 
 
For model 1 and 2, we assume that tt nl 1 , and t
m
t nl 1 , respectively, where 
0 m,  are constants associated with the marginal disutility of work.. For model 3, 
ztytt nnl 
~
1 . We use annual data for the US economy for a period of 1960-200811, taken 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data-FRED II. Consider first the 
calibration for model 1. The steady state of symmetric equilibrium includes: 
                                                 
10 The optimal 
z  can be computed using the steady state versions of (23c) and (21.1g). For the optimal y , the 
steady state versions of (23b) and (21.1f) needs to be used together.   
11 We use this dataset as a representative dataset in order to carry out a numerical experiment of our proposed 
methodology. The calibration is therefore only a numerical characterization of our methodology. 
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yngc           (26.1) 
1)1()1(   nc        (26.2) 
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1)1(  r          (26.5) 
 
The set of parameters for the model is ),,,,(  . We use an interest rate value of 4% 
which is consistent with 9615.0 . Working hours estimate is set at 0.3. According to its 
specification, the parameter  stands for the fiscal treatment of profits and is equal to the ratio 
between the profit tax rate and the labour tax rate. The profit tax in this model is the tax that 
households pay on distributed profits. McGrattan & Prescott (2005) estimate a tax rate on 
corporate distributions for the US and the UK economy, which is the personal income tax rate on 
dividend income if corporations make distributions to households by paying dividends. We use 
their period average estimate of 17.4% for 1990-2000 for the US economy. For the average 
effective tax rate on household income for the US economy, we use a value of 22.6% from Carey 
& Tchilinguirian (2000). This pins down 76991.0 . 
 
One can pin down the parameter   in either of the two ways. First, one can simply assume 
1 , which pins down   equal to the profit to output ratio. The second way is to use price 
mark up estimates from the literature and derive an estimate of   consistent with the mark up 
value, which in turn will pin down   consistent with both the profit ratio and the mark up value. 
We follow the latter. From the literature, an interesting observation is the range of estimates for 
the price mark up ratio, which for the US economy ranges from as low as 1.03 in Basu & Fernald 
(1997) to as high as 1.23 in Bayoumi et al. (2004). There are even higher estimates of this ratio for 
particular industries of the US, as may be found in detail in Martins et al. (1996). For the current 
model, we choose 12.1  as the price mark up ratio, which is the Martins et al. (1996)’s 1970-
1992 average estimate for the US industries producing differentiated goods. Given (26), the profit 
ratio and the already pinned down parameters, 12.1  pins down 99734.0 . The 
decentralized equilibrium condition (26.3) pins down 10763.0 .  
 
For model 2, the baseline wage mark up estimate is therefore equal to 1.12, which is very close to 
the recent estimate of 1.16 for the US economy, as in Bayoumi et al. (2004). For 230.g , and 
the remaining pinned down parameter values, (26) gives baseline estimate for  and m , equal to 
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2.8075 and 2.4987, respectively. The baseline parameter values for models 1 and 2 are 
summarized in appendix, table 2a. 
 
With (25), the decentralized equilibrium and (26.2), the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium for 
model 1 implies: 
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For model 2, similar steps of algebra find the condition: 
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We derive the steady state calibrated value of   and m  from (27) and (28), respectively. 
According to our baseline calibration, 097.1  and 202.1m , i.e. given 10763.0 , 
the social cost of Ramsey taxes is relatively higher in an economy with two sources of market 
distortion. Relative to the competitive goods’ market Ramsey tax, Ramsey tax in model 1 incurs 
42% less social cost in terms of forgone consumption. For model 2, the social cost is about 48% 
less than its competitive market analogue. These relative measures allow one to realize the social 
desirability of Ramsey taxes in imperfectly competitive economies. 
 
Given the baseline parameter values and the social cost of taxes, we calibrate the Ramsey taxes for 
model 1 and model 2. We also calibrate the competitive market analogue tax rate
12
. These are 
summarized in appendix, table 2b. The calibrated optimal tax rate for model 1 is equal to 62.03%, 
and its competitive market analogue optimal tax rate is equal to 65.01%. For model 2, the baseline 
parameter values gives the optimal tax rate equal to 63.28%, and its competitive goods market 
analogue optimal tax rate is equal to 69.21%. We conduct a sensitivity analysis of our key results 
(the social cost and the optimal tax rate) for both models for changes in the key parameters of the 
model, and the baseline statistics which we use to pin down the parameters of the models. These 
are presented in figure 1.  
 
                                                 
12 With competitive market setting profit ratio,   and   are zero, which is why it is necessary to reconstruct the 
implementability constraint and rerun the Ramsey problem.  
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We present the sensitivity of the social cost of optimal taxes and the sensitivity of optimal taxes 
for different values of    and   in figure 1 and figure 2. A higher degree of monopoly power is 
associated with a relatively lower utility cost of distorting taxes, which holds for both models. Put 
intuitively, this means households facing higher monopoly distortions would be more willing to 
accept a distorting tax as a corrective device. For higher values of the parameter  , the optimal 
tax rate continues to be lower. We do not find any sensitivity of the optimal tax rates for changes 
in  , implying that the government’s optimal choice of tax rate is completely independent of its 
fiscal treatment of profits. This is not surprising, since profit tax as modelled here distorts the 
welfare margin only through an income effect. Since household’s allocation decisions are not 
affected at the margin by  , the government is able to choose optimal tax rate without any 
concern of its fiscal treatment of profits. We also present the sensitivity of the social cost of 
optimal tax and the optimal tax for a plausible range of labour supply, consumption-output ratio 
and profit-output ratio, values for which were initially chosen in order to pin down the baseline 
parameter values. When we vary these statistics, we recalibrate all corresponding parameters. 
 
The sharp decline in optimal tax rate for extremely high values of   indicates that with elastic 
demand for intermediate goods (and elastic demand for labour in the wage setting model), 
monopoly distortions create compounding effect in the wedge between the social and the private 
returns to labour, and it becomes optimal to cure its more than proportionate distortions with more 
than proportionate decrease in tax rates. Higher distortions therefore necessitate a more Pigovian 
role of distorting taxes, which incurs a relatively lesser social cost. Following this intuition, for the 
monopolistic wage setting model the multiplier effect is much larger. 
 
 
Calibration of Model 3. 
 
For simplicity, we will assume 1
~
. Through this we abstract from the possibility of having 
different marginal disutility of work across sectors
13
. The decentralized equilibrium at steady state 
for model 3, with ztytt nnl 
~
1  in (25), and 1
~
, includes: 
 
kgcnnky yz 
 
 11 )(
      (29.1) 
                                                 
13 The US Bureau of Labour Statistics survey reports suggest that injury related incidence per 100 workers varies 
greatly across different industrial sectors of the US economy, and incidence rates are relatively higher in goods 
producing sector as compared to the service producing sector. This evidence is in strong support of 1
~
. On the 
other hand, as in Huffman and Wynne (1999), the assumption that disutility from work can be different across 
sectors requires specification of the intratemporal labour adjustment cost in utility function. In its simplest form, 
such utility functions are non-linear in labour which complicates the tractability of results in the Ramsey 
equilibrium due to second order and cross derivatives of labour. We follow a standard approach by assuming zero 
adjustment cost of labour and unitary marginal rate of substitution of labour across sectors. 
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)(   rknwnwg kzzzyyy       (29.9) 
 
For model 3 the set of parameters is ),,,,,(  . The parameter   is pinned down 
similarly, as in previous calibration. We use McGrattan & Prescott (2005)’s period average 
estimate for 1990-2000 for US corporate tax rate, which is 17.4%, and Carrey & Tchilinguirian 
(2000)’s estimate of average effective tax rate on capital income for the US economy, which is 
27.3%. This pins down 63730. . Capital’s share of final output is set equal to 0.36, an 
approximation that is consistent with long run US data, and also frequently used in relevant 
literature
14
. With (29.2), (29.3) and (29.4), this pins down 73510. , 14960. , and 
57590. . The calibrated value for the parameter   yields the price mark up ratio equal to 
1751. . Given the target statistics, the steady state version of capital’s law of motion pins down 
06640. . These baseline values are summarized in appendix, table 3a.  
 
In order to restrict 1
k
t  in the calibration, we impose the additional restriction 1)1(  . 
This is consistent with the steady state version of (21.1l). With baseline parameter values, 
10870.r . In a steady state, the Ramsey equilibrium condition (23d) is: 
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Using the pinned down parameters and 10870.r , (30) calibrates 02130.~
~

c
k
G
G
. With (25), 
and 1
~
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14 In model 3 the three income shares add up to 1 , which is simply one minus the profit ratio. 
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It is straightforward to verify that the term 
c
k
G
G
~
~
 is strictly negative
15
. With 02130.~
~

c
k
G
G
, and 
(31), it is straightforward to derive 98900.~  . Rerunning the calibration with competitive 
markets gives 9992.0~ p . This implies that relative to a competitive markets setting, 
implementing the optimal taxes in an imperfectly competitive economy incurs 1.02% less social 
cost in terms of forgone consumption.  
 
The quantitative findings for model 3 are summarized table 3b. Table 3b summarizes the 
calibrated Ramsey policy and the associated social cost for baseline parameter values. Our 
findings suggest that for the baseline parameter values we choose the long run optimal policy for 
the government involves tax on all income and no subsidy. The calibrated optimal tax rates are 
approximately equal to 2%, 31% and 41% for capital income, labour income from intermediate 
goods sector, and labour income from final goods sector, respectively. 
 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis of our key results for a range of values for the key parameters 
and the statistics which we use in order to pin down baseline parameter values, and these are 
presented in figure 3. These suggest that economic agents prefer the Ramsey policy than the first 
best policy for high price mark up ratio. This is perfectly consistent with our previous findings, as 
in fig 1. This is simply because the Ramsey policy compensates for monopoly distortion and 
induces lesser welfare cost than a heavy lump sum tax. Higher degree of monopoly power results 
in higher losses of output and drives a larger wedge between the social and the private returns to 
factors, which in turn distorts the work and investment incentives. Although a first best subsidy 
can be used to compensate the wedge, a heavy lump sum tax in addition reduces disposable 
income. In absence of a lump sum tax, the Ramsey policy diversifies the excess burden of taxes 
through different tax instruments, which imply that the social cost of distorting taxes becomes 
relatively lower. Once again we find no correspondence between the optimal tax rates and changes 
in the parameter  . 
  
We find that for ).,( 1700 , the relative effect of investment dominates the distortion effect of 
monopoly power which motivates the optimal policy that involves a tax on capital income. The 
peak of capital income tax is around 20% which is for very low value of  . For any 17.0 , 
                                                 
15 The term 
c
k
G
G
~
~
is the (steady state) relative effect of investment on second best level of welfare. In figure 3 we 
present the sensitivity of this term for different values of capital stock.  
 23 
the optimal policy involves a subsidy to capital income. Although high degrees of monopoly 
power are associated with high profits, they are also associated with larger wedges between the 
social and the private returns to factors which results in larger loss in output. For high degrees of 
monopoly power, the rate of increase in the wedge between the social and the private marginal 
return to capital is much larger than the rate of increase in welfare effect of investment. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks. 
 
This paper presents estimates of the social cost of optimal taxes in a class of general equilibrium 
models of imperfect competition. The social cost concept we use is somewhat similar to that of a 
present value of the excess burden of distorting taxes. In general, it simply measures a discounted 
loss in net benefits, expressed in terms of consumption, from private use of resources that results 
when a distorting tax and monopoly distortions prevent markets from attaining efficient output 
levels. This total excess burden is the loss in well-being of taxpayers over which they would suffer 
if a lump sum tax were used to collect revenues. A lump sum tax would not prevent the attainment 
of efficiency because it has no substitution effect. For the class of imperfectly competitive 
economies we consider, a lump sum tax or its equivalent (100% profit tax, say) would motivate 
the optimal policy that involves subsidies to transactions (and no tax) in order to correct the 
monopoly distortions. Such a setting would incur even a lower social cost of taxes. Given a fixed 
revenue requirement, our measure of the social cost is actually the present value of a stream of 
efficiency-loss ratio of a tax or a set of taxes, implying that in an imperfectly competitive economy 
taxes induce relatively lesser efficiency loss. 
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Tables: 
Table 1: Statistics for calibration. 
Description Value 
Government consumption to output ratio. 0.23 
Profit to output ratio. 0.11 
Bond to output ratio. 0.51 
Capital to output ratio. 3.31 
Investment to output ratio. 0.22 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data-FRED II, 1960-2008, and Revised Fixed 
Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, US Department of Commerce. 
 
Table 2a: Baseline parameter values for models 1 and 2. 
Parameter Description Value 
  Subjective discount rate. 0.9615 
  Degree of returns to scale in intermediate goods sector. 0.9973 
  Inverse of the elasticity of substitution. 0.1076 
  Fiscal treatment of profits. 0.7699 
  Value of marginal disutility of work (model 1). 2.8075 
m  Value of marginal disutility of work (model 2). 2.4987 
 
Table 2b: Optimal tax rates and social cost of taxes for models 1 and 2. 
 
p   
(Competitive  
goods market) 
p  
(Competitive 
goods market)  
  
(Ramsey, 
10760. ) 
  
 (Ramsey, 
10760. )  
Model 1 0.6501 1.921 0.6203 1.097 
Model 2 0.6921 2.327 0.6328 1.202 
 
Table 3a: Baseline parameter values for model 3. 
Parameter Description Value 
  Subjective discount rate. 0.9615 
  Capital depreciation rate. 0.0664 
  Share parameter for capital in intermediate goods sector. 0.5759 
  Share parameter for intermediate goods in final goods sector. 0.7351 
  Inverse of the elasticity of substitution. 0.1496 
  Fiscal treatment of distributed profits. 0.6373 
 
Table 3b: Calibrated optimal tax rates and the social cost of taxes for model 3. 
 
Capital income tax 
)( k  
Sector z  
labour income tax 
)( z  
Sector y  
labour income tax 
)( y  
Social Cost 
)~(  
Ramsey Policy 0.0206 0.3611 0.4653 0.9853 
 
Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis for model 1’s   and  . 
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis for model 2’s m  and m . 
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis for model 3. 
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis for model 3 continued. 
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